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While ancient scientists often had patrons to fund their work, peer
review of proposals for the allocation of resources is a foundation
of modern science. A very common method is that proposals are
evaluated by a small panel of experts (due to logistics and funding
limitations) nominated by the grant-giving institutions. The expert
panel process introduces several issues - most notably: 1) biases
introduced in the selection of the panel. 2) experts have to read a
very large number of proposals. Distributed Peer Review promises
to alleviate several of the described problems by distributing the
task of reviewing among the proposers. Each proposer is given a
limited number of proposals to review and rank.
We present the result of an experiment running a machine-learning
enhanced distributed peer review process for allocation of telescope
time at the European Southern Observatory.
In this work, we show that the distributed peer review is statisti-
cally the same as a ‘traditional’ panel, that our machine learning
algorithm can predict expertise of reviewers with a high success
rate, and we find that seniority and reviewer expertise have an in-
fluence on review quality. The general experience has been over-
whelmingly praised from the participating community (using an
anonymous feedback mechanism).
1 Introduction
All large, ground- and space-based astronomical facilities serving wide
communities, like the European Southern Observatory (ESO), the At-
acama large Millimeter Array, The Hubble Space Telescope, and the
Gemini Observatory, face a similar problem. In many cases the num-
ber of applications they receive at each call exceeds 1000, posing a se-
rious challenge to run an effective selection process through the classic
peer-review paradigm, which assigns proposals to pre-allocated panels
with fixed compositions. Although, in principle, one could increase the
size of the time allocation committee (TAC), this creates logistic and
financial problems which practically limit its maximum size, making
this solution not viable.
Since the referees only have a limited amount of time to perform
their task, the heavy load (which at ESO typically exceed 70 proposals
per referee; priv. comm. ESO OPC office) has severe consequences
on the quality of the review and the feedback that is provided to the
applicants. This contributes to increasing levels of frustration in the
community and to the loss of credibility in the whole selection process.
In addition, although difficult to quantify, this will have consequences
for the scientific output of the facilities. Different measures were con-
sidered by the various facilities to alleviate the load on the reviewers.
This includes quite drastic solutions, like the one deployed by National
Science Foundation (NSF) to limit the number of applications (Mervis,
2014a).
In this context, one of the most innovative propositions was put for-
ward by The concept is simple: by submitting a proposal the principal
investigator accepts to review n proposals submitted by peers, and to
have their proposal reviewed by n peers. Also, by submitting m pro-
posals, they accept to review n × m proposals, hence virtually limiting
the number of submissions. We will indicate this concept as Distributed
Peer Review (DPR).
The Gemini Observatory deployed the DPR for its Fast Turnaround
channel (Andersen et al., 2019), which is capped to 10% of the to-
tal time. The NSF also explored this possibility with a pilot study
in 2013, in which each PI was asked to review 7 proposals submit-
ted by peers (Ardabili & Liu, 2013; Mervis, 2014b). The NSF pi-
lot was based on 131 applications submitted by volunteers within the
Civil, Mechanical and Manufacturing Innovation Division. The NSF
did not publish a report following the study. A similar pilot experiment
was carried out in 2016 by the National Institute of Food and Agri-
culture (see https://nifa.usda.gov/resource/distributed-
peer-review-pilot-foundational-program, consulted on April
9, 2019.), but also in this case the results were not published.
We report on an experiment that employed the DPR at European
Southern Observatory (ESO) during Period 103 (call for proposals is-
sued on 30 August, 2018) in parallel with the regular Observing Pro-
grammes Comittee (OPC). We mirrored the deployment of the DPR
implementation at Gemini as an example, and enhanced the process us-
ing Natural Language Processing (NLP) and machine learning for ref-
eree selection (a different method of using NLP for proposal reviews
can be found in Strolger et al., 2017). This experiment also added a
feedback for individual reviews.
The experiment was designed to test if there is a measurable differ-
ence between the DPR and OPC, if the algorithm for referee selection
performed well, and if what referee attributes influenced the quality of
the referee report (as judged by the feedback to a review).
In Section 2, we describe the general setup of the experiment. Sec-
tion 3 is devoted to the statistical analysis and divided into Section 3.1
for the comparison between the DPR and OPC outcomes, Section 3.2
for the description of the literature matching, and Section 3.3 for the
evaluation of the helpfulness of reviews by the proposers. In Section 4
we summarize and conclude this work.
The supplementary information (SI) gives a more detailed descrip-
tion of the time allocation process at ESO (SI Section 1), a discussion
of the demographics of the experiment (SI Section 2), an extended anal-
ysis (SI Section 3), and several datasets related to the experiment (see
SI Appendices). We will refer the reader to the supplementary material
where appropriate.
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2 Experiment Overview
We followed a general outline of DPR as described in Merrifield &
Saari (2009), but differences were introduced in several key areas.
Specifically, we test two different referee selection methods: 1) the first
selection method emulates the way that reviews are currently assigned
to members of the OPC to make a comparison to the OPC evaluation of
the same proposals. 2) an automated machine-learning method to as-
sign referees to proposals (based on the DeepThought-knowledge dis-
covery method; see Kerzendorf, 2019). We believe that the advantages
of this method are that it scales easily with the number of proposals and
that, due to the automated construction, it might circumvent biases in
self-efficacy (e.g., based on gender - see Ehrlinger & Dunning, 2003).
Finally, we also asked the participants to assess the reviews of their
proposal in order to understand what influences a constructive review
and potentially reward helpful referees in the future.
We have tested a DPR scheme on a voluntary basis for the ESO
period P103. The outcome of this experiment had no influence on the
telescope allocation. The DPR program for ESO P103 recruited 172
volunteers with each submitting one participating proposal (this is 23%
of the distinct PIs in P103). These proposals were evaluated in the DPR
process as well as with the general OPC methods.
For our experiment, the group of proposers and referees were the
same. We selected eight referees for each proposal using several rules
(see the Methods Section 6.2 material for an overview of the two selec-
tion processes used).
The reviewers accessed the assigned proposals through a web ap-
plication and were given two weeks to assess them. A detailed descrip-
tion of the review options are described in the methods section (see
Section 2).
The proposal quartile and the eight unmodified comments were dis-
played to the proposer. We finally asked the proposer to evaluate the
helpfulness of the comments (with details in see Section 2).
Figure 1 summarizes the process as a flow-chart and the detailed
description of the process can be found in the Method Section 6.
3 Analysis & Results
We received complete reviews for 167 out of 172 reviewers (97.1%)
at the deadline (with these 5 proposals excluded from the further anal-
ysis). The individual grades from each review were converted into a
global rank for each proposal (with details found in the supplementary
material) and translated to quartiles (A, B,C,D).
There are a myriad of statistics available that can be interesting
to apply to the dataset (some of them are explored in the supple-
mentary material). We therefore encourage the community to make
use the anonymized dataset to run independent analyses(available at
https://zenodo.org/record/2634598). Our main focus in this
study is to address three questions: 1) How different is the DPR from
a more traditional OPC review? 2) How well can our algorithm pre-
dict expertise for a proposal? 3) What reviewer properties influence the
helpfulness of their referee report?
3.1 Comparison of the Distributed Peer Review to the Ob-
serving Programmes Comittee
The proposals used in the DPR experiment were also reviewed through
the regular ESO OPC channel. This allows a comparison between the
outcomes of the two processes. However, these differ by construction
in many aspects, and so a one-to-one comparison is not possible. This
is because in the DPR experiment:
1. there is no a priori scientific-seniority selection;
2. the proposals are typically reviewed by Nr > 6 referees (while
Nr = 3 in the pre-meeting OPC process);
3. the number of proposals per referee is much smaller;
4. the set of proposals common to different reviewers is much
smaller;
5. there is no triage; an early removal of some proposals before the
OPC meeting
6. there is no face-to-face discussion.
A robust way of quantifying the consistency between two differ-
ent panels reviewing the same set of proposals is that of the quartile
agreement fraction introduced in Patat (2018, hereafter P18; Section
9.2). Following that concept, one can compute what we will indicate
as the panel-panel (p-p) quartile agreement matrix (QAM). The generic
QAM element Mi, j is the fraction of proposals ranked by the first panel
in the i-th quartile of the grade distribution, that were ranked in the j-th
quartile by the second panel. If we indicate with Ai and B j the events ”a
proposal is ranked by panel A in quartile i” and ”a proposal is ranked
by panel B in quartile j”, the QAM elements represent the conditional
probability:
Mi, j = P(Ai|B j) = P(Ai ∩ B j)P(A j) .
For a completely aleatory process P(Ai ∩ B j) = P(Ai)P(B j), and
therefore all the terms of the QAM would be equal to 0.25, while for
a full correlation, all terms would be null, with the exception of the
diagonal terms, which would be equal to 1. We note that the matrix
elements are not independent from each other as, by definition:∑
i
Mi, j ≡
∑
j
Mi, j ≡ 1.
For the purposes of the main part of this paper, we will compare
the internal agreement of the DPR panels with that of the OPC (pre-
meeting). Section 10.5 in the supplementary information gives further
comparison between the OPC and DPR statistics.
For doing this, we will bootstrap the DPR data extracting a number
of sub-sets of three randomly chosen referees.
This choice for the DPR set is particularly interesting as it is di-
rectly comparable to the results presented in P18. The procedure is
as follows: We first make a selection of the proposals having at least
6 reviews (164). For each of them we randomly select two distinct
(i.e. non-intersecting) sub-sets of Nr=3 grades each, from which two
average grades are derived. These are used to compute the agreement
fractions between the two sub-panels. The process is repeated a large
number of times and the average (p-p) QAM is finally obtained.
In Figure 2, we compare the QAM of our subsets with that of the
OPC pre-meeting panels. The latter was derived for the OPC process
for Nr=3 sub-panels (P18, Table 3 therein). In both cases the first-
quartile agreement is about 40% (k=0.21), while for the second and
third quartile this is ∼30%. The top-bottom quartile agreement is 10%
(k = −0.60). The conclusion is that, in terms of self-consistency, the
DPR review behaves in the same way as the pre-meeting OPC process.
The two review processes are characterized the same level of subjec-
tivity.
3.2 Domain knowledge inference
Another aim of the DPR experiment is to infer a referee’s domain
knowledge for a given proposal using machine learning. “Expertise”
is, unfortunately, no objective quantity. However, it is reasonable to
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Figure 1: Overview of the enhanced distributed peer-review process. The graph shows the flow of the proposal starting with the proposer in
the upper left-hand corned. The proposal then goes into the reviewer selection (with the two groups marked), via the review and finally to the
grade-aggregation. The loop closes with the proposer giving feedback on the usefulness of the review.
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Figure 2: Comparison of reviewer agreement between both DPR and the classic process Comparison between the panel-panel for the OPC
subsets (left, from P18 Table 3) and the DPR subsets (right). Each panel shows the probability the second panel (or DPR subset) is grading
a specific proposal given the response by the first panel. The probability is highest on the diagonal which suggests there is some correlation
between different reviewers grading – albeit a relatively weak one.
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Figure 3: Accuracy of DeepThought expertise predciction Condi-
tional probability P(self reported|DeepThought) for the various combi-
nations of perceived and DeepThought inferred knowledge. The self-
reported knowledge came directly from being a required field to an-
swer in the refereeing proposal. The match provided by deepthought
was calculated purely algorithmically.
assume that the self-judgement of expertise (self-efficacy) is a good
measure that might approximate such a quantity.
Given:
• “self reported” as the self reported domain knowledge
• DeepThought as the DeepThought inferred domain knowledge
For our experiment, we calculate the joint probability
P(Self Reported|DeepThought) using Bayes theorem:
P(Self Reported|DeepThought) = (1)
P(DeepThought|Self Reported)P(Self Reported)
P(DeepThought)
P(Self Reported|DeepThought) = (2)
P(DeepThought) ∩ (Self Reported)
P(DeepThought)
Figure 3 shows the correlation between self reported knowledge
(see the detailed description of the experiment in the supplementary
material) and our predicted DeepThought inferred knowledge (see sup-
plementary material for a detailed description of the method).
We reiterate that we are not comparing to the true domain knowl-
edge but to the self-reported knowledge. We find that DeepThought
will predict the opposite of the self-reported knowledge in only ≈ 10%
of the cases (predicting expert with self-reported “no knowledge” and
vice versa). We emphasize the ≈ 80% success rate of predicting “no
knowledge”. These numbers show a high success rate in removing
whose expertise does not overlap with the proposal.
3.3 Rating the helpfulness of review comments
After the review process, we asked the proposers to evaluate the “help-
fulness” of the review comments. A total of 136 reviewers provided
feedback.
The review usefulness distribution shows a steady rise, with a sud-
den drop-off at the ‘very helpful’ bin, as shown in all panels of Fig. 4.
About 55% of the users rated the comments in the ‘helpful’ and ‘very
helpful’ bins.
To check what factors might influence the ability to write helpful
comments we use the statistical method given at the beginning of this
section.
The reviewer’s expertise is expected to have an influence on the
helpfulness of comments. Figure 4a,b shows the influence of both self-
reported knowledge and DeepThought-inferred knowledge on the help-
fulness of the comment. The probabilities are very similar between the
self-reported and inferred knowledge. We highlight that experts seem-
ingly very rarely give unhelpful comments and that non-experts rarely
give very helpful comments.
The last test is to see how the comments helpfulness is be-
ing evaluated given the ranking of the proposal within the quartiles
P(helpful comment|proposal quartile). This shows a similar distribu-
tion to the other panels in Fig. 4. There are some small differences.
Comments for proposals from the second to the top quartile often were
perceived as relatively helpful. Comments on proposals in the last quar-
tile were rarely ranked as very helpful (Van Rooyen et al., 1999, finds
a similar effect).
We checked whether seniority has an influence on the ability to cre-
ate helpful comments. Figure 4c shows some correlation between the
seniority and the ability for the referee to give helpful comments. Most
interesting is the apparent inability of graduate students to give very
helpful comments. This might be a training issue and can be resolved
by exposing the students to schemes such as DPR.
We have also asked about the helpfulness of the comment in our
general feedback (Supplementary Information). The distribution of
comment usefulness follows the distribution of helpfulness for indi-
vidual comments relatively closely (see statistics in Supplementary In-
formation). The comments given in the DPR compare very favourably
with the OPC (see details in Supplementary Information).
4 Summary and Conclusions
The main advantages of the DPR paradigm (coupled to the
DeepThought approach) over the classic panel concept can be listed
as follows.
Advantages:
• it allows a much larger statistical basis (each proposal can be eas-
ily reviewed by 8-10 scientists), enabling robust outlier rejection;
• it removes possible biases generated by panel member nomina-
tions;
• the larger pool of scientists allows a much better coverage in terms
of proposal–expertise matching;
• the smaller number of proposals per reviewer allows for more
careful work and more useful feedback;
• coupled to the DeepThought approach for proposal–referee
matching, it is suited to be made semi-automatised; it also gives an
objective criteria for ‘expertise’ removing biases in self-reporting;
• it removes the concept of panel, which adds rigidity to the process;
• it addresses the problem of maximising the proposal–referee
match while maximising the overlap in the evaluations, which is
a typical issue in pre-allocated panels (see Cook et al., 2005, and
references therein);
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Figure 4: Influence of various factors on the perceived quality of the review We show a number of factors that can influence the (perceived)
quality of the review that was graded by the proposers in the feedback step. Upper Row: Evaluation of the helpfulness of the comment given
expertise (inferred by DeepThought on the left panel and self reported on the right panel). Lower Left: We show the conditional probability
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• the lack of a face-to-face meeting greatly simplifies the logistics
and the costs, making it attractive for small, budget-limited facili-
ties;
• the absence of the meeting prevents strong personal opinions from
having a pivotal influence on the process;
• it involves a larger part of the community, increasing its demo-
cratic breadth;
• all applicants are exposed to the typical quality of the proposals.
This allows them to better understand if their request is not allo-
cated time by placing it in a much wider context, and helps im-
proving their proposal-writing skills (comment by Arash Takshi:
“The ability to see what my competitors were doing filled a blind
spot for me. Now I know that if I don’t get funded, it’s because
of the quality of the other proposals, not something I did wrong.”
Mervis, 2014b);
• it trains the members of the community without additional effort.
Disadvantages:
• The lack of a meeting does not allow the exchange of opinions
and the possibility of asking and answering questions to/from the
peers;
• exposition of proposal content to a larger number of individuals
(167 vs. 78 in the real case of the DPR experiment) increases the
risk of confidentiality issues.
The two major disadvantages can, however, be easily addressed:
barring the fact that its effectiveness remains to be demonstrated and
quantified (see above), the social, educational and networking aspects
of the face-to-face meeting should not be undervalued. In this respect,
we notice that the resources freed by the DPR approach can be used by
the organizations for education and community networking (training on
proposal writing, fostering collaborations, ...). Another possibility to
enable the interaction between the reviewers is to allow them to up-vote
or down-vote the comments by other reviewers (the Science journal
employs such an approach) which could be used to exclude comments
and grades that were down-voted by a very significant fraction of the
other referees.
We conclude that the participating community has reacted ex-
tremely positively to this (see Section B in the supplementary mate-
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rial). The presented approach to infer expertise works very well (see
Figure 3). On an individual level, the behavior of the DPR referees con-
forms to the statistical description of the regular OPC referees (P18),
and there is no statistically significant evidence that junior reviewers
systematically deviate from this (see Section 3.1). The introduction of
the possibility to rate the helpfulness of comments provides a new av-
enue to potentially reward helpful referees and train referees in general
on giving useful feedback.
We encourage other organization to run similar studies, to progress
from a situation in which the classic peer-review is adopted notwith-
standing its limitations in the lack of better alternatives. As scientists,
we firmly believe in experiments, even when these concern the way we
select the experiments themselves.
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METHODS
6 Description of the DeepThought DPR experiment
For an overview of the process see Section 2. In the next sections, we will
give a detailed description of the process of the DeepThought DPR experi-
ment.
6.1 Reviewer exclusion and selection
Reviewer selection is a core part of the experiment. We separated this
step into reviewer exclusion and reviewer selection. We tested two differ-
ent strategies for reviewer selection: one based on a standard methodology
(called “OPC emulate” [OE]), the other based on a machine-estimated of
the domain-specific knowledge (called “DeepThought” [DT]), which are de-
scribed in detail in Section 6.2.2.
We describe the reviewer exclusion and selection using the abstract con-
cept of a matrix. The matrix has a row for each proposer and a column for
each referee. In our case, the referees and proposers are the same set, and
thus we have a square matrix.
Our exclusion matrix was constructed in a way that would mark a referee
ineligible to review a proposal where any of the investigators were from the
same institute as the referee
Aexclusion =

p1 p2 · · · pn
referee1 1 1 · · · 0
referee2 0 1 · · · 0
... 1 0 · · · 0
refereen 0 0 · · · 1
, (3)
where pn stands for proposern, 1 indicates conflict and 0 no conflict.
For the OPC-emulate group, we also constructed an additional matrix
(that was combined to the previous exclusion matrix using the logical or)
that marks a referee ineligible to review a proposal that was submitted to the
same unit telescope as the referee’s submitted proposal.
We constructed a reviewing matrix that marks a reviewer-proposal com-
bination with 1 (and the rest of the matrix with 0). We then used a round-
robin selection process to iterate through the referees. For each referee, we
use the exclusion matrix to determine eligible proposals and then the specific
selection criterion for each of the groups (outlined in Section 6.1) to assign
one of the remaining available proposals (taking into account the exclusion
matrix). This process was repeated until all referees had been assigned eight
proposals. If the process failed before completion, it was restarted with a
different random number seed until we found a solution. A solution ma-
trix needs to have all row sums and column sums equal to eight. For fu-
ture projects, we strongly suggest to research algorithms from operations
research (or combinatorial optimization) that have been optimized for the
given process.
6.2 Reviewer selection methodology
We separated the volunteer base into two groups for our two experiments.
The first group was 60 randomly chosen volunteers out of the 172. This
group was assigned proposals that would closely emulate the current way
ESO assigns proposals in the OPC (which is a variant of the common time-
allocation strategy present in the astronomy community).
The second group of the remaining 112 volunteers was assigned by pre-
dicting their expertise of a proposal based on their publication history using
machine learning.
6.2.1 OPC emulate Group
We aim with this selection process to emulate the OPC process. The mem-
bers of the OPC assign themselves to expert groups in four categories
• A - Cosmology and Intergalactic Medium
• B - Galaxies
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• C - Interstellar Medium, Star Formation, and Planetary systems
• D - Stellar Evolution
Multiple panels are then constructed for each subgroup (depending on
the number of proposals for each subgroup).
We attempt to emulate this process by constructing four groups (A, B,
C, and D) of 15 referees. Each of these groups only reviews the proposals
in their group. Thus each referee will only see proposals within the same
category that they proposed in.
We construct an exclusion matrix for each of the subgroups (see Equa-
tion 3) and then proceed with the review selection (see Section 6.1) where at
each selection step we simply randomly select any eligible proposal.
The total number of reviews from this process was 480.
6.2.2 DeepThought Group
The general idea behind this selection process is to use the published pa-
pers of each participant to predict how knowledgeable they were for each
proposal. This made extensive use of the dataset and techniques presented
in Kerzendorf (2019). This required identifying their publications, construct
knowledge-vectors for each referee, construct proposal vectors from the sub-
mitted latex document, construct a knowledge matrix for each of the combi-
nation of referee and proposal, and use this matrix in the selection process.
Name disambiguation The first part of this process was to uniquely
identify participants in ADS to infer their publications. Milojevic´ (2013)
has shown using the last name and the first initials only 6.1% of author’s
identities are contaminated (either due to splitting or merging) which is suf-
ficient for the statistical requirements of our experiment.
We then used the Python package ads (available at https://ads.
readthedocs.io) to access the ADS API to search for the participant’s
papers (and their arxiv identifiers) without regard for position of authorship.
We excluded participants (moved them to the OPC emulate group) that have
less than 3 papers (9 participants) or more than 500 papers (4 participants).
Knowledge Vectors Kerzendorf (2019) shows in Section 4 the construc-
tion of vectors from publication (using a technique called TFiDF). We used
the document vectors from Kerzendorf (2019) given of all publications iden-
tified for each participant in the previous step. These document vectors were
summed up and then normalized. We call such a vector sum for each referee
a “knowledge vectors”.
Proposal vectors We use the machinery described in Kerzendorf (2019)
to process several sections of the latex representation (’Title’, ’Abstract’,
’ScientificRationale’, ’ImmediateObjective’) of the submitted proposal.
These were then converted to normalized document vectors which we re-
fer to as “proposal vectors”.
Knowledge Matrix We then construct a knowledge matrix similar to the
exclusion matrix and fill each of its elements with the dot-product between
the proposal vector and referee knowledge vector (cosine distance; see Equa-
tion 4).
Aknowledge =

p1 p2 · · · pn
referee1 0.8 0.4 · · · 0.1
referee2 0.5 0.9 · · · 0.5
...
...
...
. . .
...
refereen 0.6 0.2 · · · 0.7
, (4)
where pn stands for proposern.
As opposed to the OPC-emulate case, we do not assign proposals ran-
domly to the referees during the selection step in the referee selection pro-
cess (see Section 6.1). The proposals are picked according to the following
algorithm with different steps for the first four, subsequent two and last two
proposals picked for each referee:
1. from the available proposals choose the one with the highest cosine
distance for the first four proposals assigned to each referee
2. from the available proposals choose the proposal closest to the median
of all cosine scores for that particularly referee for the next two pro-
posals
3. from the available proposals choose the one with the lowest cosine
distance for the last two proposals assigned to each referee
The process was repeated with a different random if there were no eight
suitable proposals available for each referee. Depending on the number of
constraints and participants it took on the order of three times too find a
suitable solution.
6.3 Review process
The participants were given a login to evaluate the proposals. After signing a
Non Disclosure Agreement (which is identical to the one signed by the OPC
members), the participants could view the proposals assigned to them. They
were first given the option to indicate a conflict of interest (removing them
from making an eligible vote on the proposal). Then were asked for their
expertise on the proposal’s topic. They were tasked to review the proposals
by giving them a score (1 - 5; same as in the OPC), their assessment of their
knowledge of the proposal, and a comment.
We outline the steps in more detail in the following. The following
options were given to indicate a conflict:
• No, I do not have a conflict.
• Yes, I have a close personal or professional relationship with the
PI and/or team.
• Yes, I am a direct competitor to this proposal.
The referees were instructed to consider the following questions when eval-
uating a proposal:
• Is there sufficient background/context for the non-expert (i.e.,
someone not specialized in this particular sub-field)?
• Are previous results (either by proposers themselves or in the
published literature) clearly presented?
• Are the proposed observations and the Immediate Objectives per-
tinent to the background description?
• Is the sample selection clearly described, or, if a single target, is
its choice justified?
• Are the instrument modes, and target location(s) (e.g., cosmology
fields) specified clearly?
• Will the proposed observations add significantly to the knowledge
of this particular field?
They were then asked to assess their expertise of the proposal:
• This is my field of expertise.
• I have some general knowledge of this field.
• I have little or no knowledge of this field.
They were instructed to use the following general grading rules:
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• 1.0 outstanding: breakthrough science
• 1.5 excellent: definitely above average
• 2.0 very good: no significant weaknesses
• 2.5 good: minor deficiencies do not detract from strong scientific
case
• 3.0 fair: good scientific case, but with definite weaknesses
• 3.5 rather weak: limited science return prospects
• 4.0 weak: little scientific value and/or questionable scientific
strategy
• 4.5 very weak: deficiencies outweigh strengths
• 5.0 rejected
The referees then had to write a comment with a minimum of 10 characters.
6.4 Grade Aggregation
In the experiment design, each proposal was assigned to Nr=8 peers, and
each PI was assigned Np=8 proposals. In practice, because of the declared
conflicts, proposals were evaluated by 4 to 8 referees, with Nr ≥6 in 95%
of the cases. For the same reason, each referee reviewed between 5 and
8 proposals, with Np ≥6 in 98% of the cases. This guarantees statistical
robustness in the grade aggregation.
In the OPC process, the grades given by the distinct referees are com-
bined using a simple average, after applying the referee calibration. This
operation is described in Patat (2018) (Sect. 2.4 and Appendix A therein),
and aims at minimizing the systematic differences in the grading scales used
by the reviewers. In the current implementation, the calibration consists in
a shift-and-stretch linear transformation, by which the grade distributions of
the single referees are brought to have the same average and standard de-
viation (grades ≥3 are excluded from the calculations). This operation is
justified by the relatively large number of proposals reviewed by each ref-
eree (>60), which makes the estimate of the central value and dispersion
reasonably robust.
The case of the DPR is different in this respect, as a given person would
have reviewed at most Np=8 proposals. Especially for the dispersion, this
limitation certainly weakens its statistical significance. For this reason, fol-
lowing the example of the Gemini Fast Turn Around channel (Andersen
et al., 2019), and for the purposes of providing feedback to the users, the
raw grades were combined without applying any referee calibration (the ef-
fects of calibration in the DPR experiment are presented and discussed in the
main text).
6.5 Review evaluation
After the review deadline the participants were given access to a page with
the peer-reviews (most of the time seven or eight) of their proposal. The
applicants are given the quartile rank as a letter (A-D; as calculated in Sec-
tion 6.4). For each comment, they were asked to rank its helpfulness:
We would be grateful if you could rate each review on a scale of 1 (not
helpful) to 4 (very helpful) how much this comment helps improve your
proposal (positive comments like ”best proposal I ever read” - can
be ranked as not helpful as it does not improve the proposal further).
These ratings will not be distributed further but help us for statistical
purposes.
6.6 Questionnaire
Each participant in the DPR experiment was asked to fill out a questionnaire
after performing the reviews and receiving the feedback on their own pro-
posal:
Also, after reading the reviews, please take 10-15 minutes to fill the
final questionnaire (see the link at the bottom of this page). Although it
is optional, it is your chance to give us feedback on any aspect that you
liked/disliked and to shape a future DPR process. It will also greatly
assist us in understanding how the experiment went, learn about what
works and not, which biases are still present etc. It will allow us to
build better tools for you in the future.
Out of 167 participants, 140 returned a completed on-line questionnaire
(83.8%). Most of the questions were multiple choice (see supplementary
material Section A) with many of the answers used in the following sections
in the evaluation of the DPR experiment.
The questionnaire also included 5 free-format questions: (i) What sug-
gestions do you have to improve the software?, (ii) What suggestions do you
have to improve the assessment criteria and/or review process?, (iii) Do you
have concerns about your proposals being evaluated through distributed peer
review?, (iv) Do you have any further feedback or suggestions regarding dis-
tributed peer review?, and (v) Would you like to give any further feedback
and/or suggestions regarding earlier raised points on securing confidentiality,
external expertise, and robustness versus bias?
Each of the 5 free-form questions was answered on average by 50 per-
sons with a sentence or more. The answers were very helpful in specific
suggestions for improvement and to get an overall feedback as summarized
in the main text).
6.7 Data Collection
The proposals were distributed to the participated on 8 October, 2018. The
participants were given until Oct 25 (17 days) until the deadline to sub-
mit the reviews. At the time of the deadline 2 of 112 participants in the
DeepThought group and 3 of 60 participants in the OPC emulate group
had not completed their reviews and were excluded from the further pro-
cess (completion rate 97.1%). We received a total of 1336 reviews (from
167 reviewers for 172 proposals).
On 30 October the 167 remaining participants were given access to their
evaluated proposals and were given two weeks to provide feedback. Of
these, 136 (81.4%) completed the questionnaire.
We aim to allow further study of this dataset by the community. We also
want to ensure the privacy of our participants and thus have anonymized and
redacted some of the dataset. In particular, we have given the participants
randomized IDs and only give some derived products from the DeepThought
machinery (we are not sharing properties knowledge vectors as they might
allow the reconstruction of the individuals). In addition, we have removed
any free text data the participants entered (such as the comments on the pro-
posal). We have also removed all participants that did not reveal their gender.
This is a very small number and might be used to de-anonymize individuals.
The anonymized dataset is available at https://zenodo.org/
record/2634598.
7 Statements
Author Contributions: We use the CRT standard (see https://
casrai.org/credit/) for reporting the author contributions:
• Conceptualization: Kerzendorf, Patat, van de Ven
• Data curation: Kerzendorf, Patat
• Formal Analysis: Kerzendorf, Patat
• Investigation: Kerzendorf, Patat
8
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• Supervision: Kerzendorf, Patat
• Validation: Kerzendorf, Patat, van de Ven, Pritchard
• Visualization: Kerzendorf, Patat, Pritchard
• Writing original draft: Kerzendorf, Patat, Pritchard
• Writing review & editing: Kerzendorf, Patat, van de Ven,
Pritchard
Competing Interests: The authors declare no competing interests.
Data Availability: The anonymized data is available at https://
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Supplementary Information
The Supplementary information is structured in the following way.
In Section 8, we described the general process of ESO Time allocation.
Section 9 gives an overview of the demographics of the experiment and
discusses self-efficacy based on several criteria. Section 10 provides
further analysis of the data. Appendix A gives the exact wording of the
questions including some statistics. Appendix B provides additional
statistics for the feedback survey.
8 Time allocation at ESO
ESO is an intergovernmental organization established in 1962, and runs
one of the largest ground-based astronomical facilities world-wide. Ev-
ery semester, about 900 proposals including more than 3000 distinct
scientists from 50 different countries are submitted to ESO, requesting
time on a large suite of telescopes: the four 8.2 m units of the Very
Large Telescope (VLT), VISTA (4.2 m), 3.6 m, NTT (3.5 m), VST (2.6
m), and the Atacama Pathfinder Experiment (APEX), placed on three
different sites in Chile. The total time request for Period 103 (the one
relevant for the DPR experiment), was about 23 000 hours. The over-
subscription rate varies with telescopes, and for the VLT is typically
around 4 (a detailed oversubscription statistics can be found at https:
//www.eso.org/sci/observing/phase1/p96/pressure.html).
The proposal review process at ESO is extensively described in
Patat & Hussain (2013), and is summarized in Patat (2018). The reader
is referred to those publications for more details. Here only a very brief
summary is given.
The members of the ESO TAC (the Observing Programmes Com-
mittee; OPC) who review the proposals are mostly nominated by the
Users Committee, in turn composed by representatives of all member
states. The nominations are reviewed by the OPC Nominating Com-
mittee, which makes a final recommendation to the Director General.
As a rule, the panel members are required to have a minimum seniority
level, starting with scientists at their second post-doc onward. The cur-
rent implementation includes 13 Panels with 6 referees each, and cover
the four scientific categories (Cosmology; Galaxy structure and evolu-
tion; Interstellar medium, Star formation and planetary systems; Stellar
evolution). The panels are composed in such a way to maximize the ex-
pertise coverage (while also taking into account other constraints, like
affiliations, gender, and seniority). Although some panels are created to
cover special cases (e.g. interferometry), the proposals are distributed
randomly within the panels of a given scientific category. Institutional
conflicts are taken into account by the distribution software, while sci-
entific conflicts are declared by the referees during the initial phases of
the review.
The process is composed of two steps: 1) asynchronous at home,
and 2) synchronous face-to-face. In the first step (which is called pre-
meeting), the proposals are assigned to 3 referees, who are asked to
review and grade the proposals using a scale from 1 to 5.1 The pre-
meeting grades are used to compile a first rank list, and triage is ap-
plied to the bottom 30% (in time) for each telescope separately. At the
meeting, the surviving proposals are discussed and graded by all non-
conflicted members. The final rank lists per telescope are compiled
based on the meeting grades, and the time is allocated following this
final rank.
9 Demographics of the Experiment
The participants were asked to voluntarily give feedback and statistics
about themselves and their experience in the experiment. We received
this information from 140 out of 167 final participants.
1Before Period 102 all non-conflicted members of a panel (up to 6) would review all
proposals assigned to their panel. As of Period 102, in order to alleviate the work-load, this
was reduced to 3.
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work participants and the general community.
I do
n’t
hav
e m
y P
hD
yet
Les
s th
an 4
year
s
Bet
wee
n 4
and
12 y
ears
Mor
e th
an 1
2 ye
ars
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
F
ra
ct
io
n
seniority (this work)
seniority (Patat 16)
Figure 6: Career level distribution of Principal Investigators. We chose
to plot the Patat (2016) postdoc fraction for both the “less than 4 years
after PhD” and “between 4 and 12 years”. We chose the professional
astronomer category to plot over the “more than 12 years” past PhD
column.
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Figure 5 and Figure 6 suggest that the self-selected participants
of this study are representative of the ESO community at large. The
PI gender distribution in the DPR experiment is 32.4% (F) and 67.6%
(M), to be compared to the values derived from a sample of about 3000
PIs (Patat, 2016): 29.0% (F), 71.0% (M). In terms of scientific senior-
ity, the DPR PIs are distributed as follows: 8.9% (no PhD), 18.3%
(<4 years after PhD), 33.8% (between 4 and 12 years after PhD), 39%
(more than 12 years after PhD). For the sample discussed in Patat
(2016) the distribution is: 18.7% (PhD students), 33.9% (post-docs),
47.4% (senior astronomers). Although the two studies have a different
seniority classification scheme, the overall comparison shows that the
DPR includes a fair amount of junior scientists, properly sampling the
underlying population.
We cannot guarantee that there are not specific attributes that lead
our participants to self-selection, but if they exist they are well hidden.
Most participants are relatively experienced submitting proposals
(see Figure 13). However, most of them have not served on a TAC (see
Figure 7).
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Figure 7: Combined fractions from the feedback questions (see Sec-
tion A) of Have you served on another time allocation committee? and
How often have you been a panel member of the ESO Observing Pro-
grammes Committee (OPC)?
10 Supplementary Analysis
10.1 Self-Efficacy
The DeepThought algorithm described in this work is built to predict
domain expertise. However, domain expertise is not a measurable at-
tribute of reviewers. A close approximator might be the self-reported
domain expertise but this comes with its own biases when compared
with an actual – but immeasurable – domain knowledge. Evaluating
one’s ability to perform a task (in this case reviewing a proposal is
called self efficacy). We can use our dataset to study the self efficacy
of our participants before moving onto testing the DeepThought algo-
rithm against the self-reported expertise.
Seniority is expected to have an impact on expertise. Figure 8
shows that the self-reported domain expertise is significantly lower for
junior scientists compared to senior scientists. Junior scientist, also
often suggest that they have little to no knowledge about a field. This
might suggests that self-reported knowledge is a useful proxy for actual
knowledge.
Table 1: Bootstrapped DPR r-r QAM.
1st referee. 2nd referee Quartile
quartile 1 2 3 4
1 0.33 0.26 0.24 0.18
2 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.23
3 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.26
4 0.18 0.23 0.26 0.34
Huang (2013) is a large meta-study of academic self-efficacy and
shows that women tend to under-predict their performance in certain
STEM fields. Figure 8 suggests that in the domain of astrophysics,
and for post-grad individuals, the difference between the self-efficacy
of men and women is relatively small.
10.2 Expertise influence on Review
An important question is whether expertise has an influence on the re-
view process itself.
Statistics shows that experts take tentatively less time to review
proposals than non-experts (see supplementary material for statistics).
We also study how expertise influences the grade distribution. Fig-
ure 9 shows that the difference in the shapes related to experts and
referees with little to no domain knowledge is relatively small. The
distributions show an extended tail towards poor grades, similarly to
what is seen in Figure 4 of Patat (2018) for the large OPC sample.
In their study on the effects of reviewer expertise on the evaluation
of funding applications, Gallo et al. (2016) concluded that ”reviewers
with higher levels of self-assessed expertise tended to be harsher in
their evaluations”. That study was based on a sample of 1044 review-
ers, i.e. 6 times larger than ours. Although our data may contain some
indication of this trend, the differences are statistically marginal.
10.3 Influence of gender on helpfulness of referee report
We study if gender of the referee has an influence on the helpfulness
of the comments in Figure 10 and find that there is no statistically sig-
nificant difference between the helpfulness of comments by male and
female referees. There were very few participants that used the option
”prefer not to say” on the gender question (see Figure 5). We thus did
not report the helpfulness statistics on those participants as the statisti-
cal noise is too large to draw conclusions.
10.4 Comparison of DeepThought Distributed Peer Re-
view to the Observing Progr
We will use the concept of the quartile agreement matrix (QAM) and
related statistics as described in Section 3 of the main paper. We will
present additional statistics such as individual referee comparison in
this supplementary information.
We first compute the agreement fractions between pairs of sub-sets
of reviews within the DPR sample. In a first test, for each of the 172
proposals we extract a random pair of reviews, which are then used to
produce two rank-lists, from which the QAM is derived. The process
is then repeated a large number of times, leading to the construction
of an average QAM and the standard deviation matrix. Since this is
constructed for simple reviewer pairs, we will indicate it as the referee-
referee (r-r) QAM. The result is presented in Table 1 for the calibrated
grades (very similar values are obtained using the raw grades). The
typical standard deviation of single realizations is 0.06, while the un-
certainty (using poisson statistics;)on the average values is below 0.01.
The values are statistically indistinguishable from those reported in
P18 (Table 2) for the OPC sample including ∼15,000 proposals. This
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shows that the average r-r agreement is identical in the two processes.
On average, the ranking lists produced by two distinct referees have
about 33% of the proposals in common in their first and last quartiles.
This corresponds to a Cohen’s kappa coefficient κ=0.11 (Cohen, 1960).
In the central quartiles the intersection is compatible with a purely ran-
dom selection. This extends to the mixed cases (i , j), with the ex-
ception of the extreme quartiles: the fraction of proposals ranked in the
first quartile by one referee and in the fourth quartile by another referee
is ∼18%, which deviates in a statistically significant way from the ran-
dom value (κ = −0.28). No meaningful difference is seen in the QAMs
computed for the OPC-Emulate (OE; 60 proposals) and Deep-Thought
(DT; 112 proposals) sub-samples.
As a further test, we have investigated the possible dependence on
the scientific seniority level. In the feedback questionnaire we asked
the participants to express it in terms of the years after PhD, specified
within 4 groups (0=no PhD; 1=less than 4 years; 2=between 4 and 12;
3: more than 12). Of the 167 reviewers, 136 provided this information,
which we used to divide the reviewers in two classes: junior (groups 0
and 1) and senior (groups 2 and 3). These classes roughly correspond
to PhD students plus junior post-docs (37), and advanced post-docs
plus senior scientists (99). We then computed the r-r QAM for the two
classes. The first quartile terms are 0.22 and 0.32 for the two classes,
respectively. At face value this indicates a larger agreement between
senior reviewers. However, the small size of the junior class (37 people)
produces a significant scatter, and therefore we do not attach too much
confidence to this result.
We have defined the panel-panel (p-p) agreement fraction in the
main text (see Section 3). For the OE and DT sub-samples yield sta-
tistically indistinguishable values. Finally, the numbers derived from
the bootstrap procedure fully agree with the results presented in P18
for different panel sizes. For Nr=1, 2, and 3 the first quartile agreement
fractions are 0.34, 0.37 and 0.41, respectively. These match (within the
noise) the corresponding P18 values (Table 8): 0.33, 0.39 and 0.45.
The conclusion is that, in terms of self-consistency, the DPR review
behaves in the same way as the pre-meeting OPC process.
10.5 The DPR-OPC agreement fraction
As anticipated, the proposals used in the DPR experiment were also
subject to the regular OPC review. This enables the comparison be-
tween the outcomes of the two selections, with the caveats outlined
above about their inherent differences.
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Table 2: DPR-OPC (pre-meeting) r-r QAM.
DPR ref. OPC referee quartile
quartile 1 2 3 4
1 0.31 0.26 0.24 0.18
2 0.24 0.27 0.25 0.24
3 0.24 0.23 0.26 0.26
4 0.20 0.23 0.25 0.31
For a first test we used a bootstrap procedure in which, for each
proposal included in the DPR, we randomly extracted one evaluation
from the DPR (typically one out of 7) and one from the OPC (one out
of 3), forming two ranking lists from which a QAM was computed.
The operation was repeated a large number of times and the average
and standard deviation matrices were constructed. This approach pro-
vides a direct indication of the DPR-OPC agreement at the r-r level,
and overcomes the problem that the two reviews have a different num-
ber of evaluations per proposal (see below). The result is presented in
Table 2. The typical standard deviation of single realizations from the
average is 0.06.
This matrix is very similar to that derived within the DPR reviews
(Table 1), possibly indicating a DPR-OPC r-r agreement slightly lower
than the corresponding DPR-DPR. A check run on the two sub-samples
for the junior and senior DPR reviewers (according to the classification
described in the previous section) has given statistically indistinguish-
able results.
As explained in the introduction, the proposals were reviewed by
Nr=3 OPC referees in the pre-meeting phase. This constitutes a signifi-
cant difference, in that the DPR ranking is typically based on ∼7 grades,
whilst the pre-meeting OPC ranking rests on 3 grades only. With this
caveat in mind, one can nevertheless compute the QAM for the two
overall ranking lists.
The result (computed using calibrated grades) is presented in Ta-
ble 3. At face value, about 37% of the proposals ranked in the 1st
quartile by the DPR were ranked in the same quartile by the OPC, with
a similar fraction for the bottom quartile. When looking at these val-
ues, one needs to consider that this is only one realization, which is
affected by a large scatter, as one can deduce from the comparatively
large fluctuations in the QAM. These are evident when comparing, for
instance, to the average values obtained from the bootstrapping proce-
Table 3: DPR-OPC (pre-meeting) p-p QAM.
DPR OPC quartile
quartile 1 2 3 4
1 0.37 0.26 0.28 0.09
2 0.28 0.16 0.28 0.28
3 0.16 0.40 0.19 0.26
4 0.19 0.19 0.26 0.37
Table 4: Simulated p-p QAM (top) and uncertainty (bottom) for two
panels with Nr=3 and Nr=7.
1st pan. 2nd panel quartile
quartile 1 2 3 4
1 0.51 0.28 0.16 0.06
2 0.28 0.31 0.27 0.15
3 0.16 0.27 0.30 0.28
4 0.06 0.15 0.28 0.51
1 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.06
2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09
3 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10
4 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.11
dures described in the previous section; or considering that the average
matrix is expected to be symmetric.
To quantify the expected noise on a single panel-panel realization,
we have run a set of simulations along the lines described in P18, which
are based on the statistical description of the reviewers and on the True
Grade Hypothesis (see P18; Section 7 therein). For the purposes of this
analysis we modified the original code to allow the calculation of the
QAM for pairs of panels with different sizes. We emphasize that the
P18 code was designed to simulate the OPC process, i.e. it deals with
panels reviewing the same set of proposals which, in turn, are reviewed
by all referees in the panels. It therefore does not fully reproduce the
DPR side, in which each proposal is reviewed by a virtually differ-
ent panel in the DeepThought sub-sample. For this reason the results
should be considered only as indicative. More sophisticated simula-
tions will be presented elsewhere.
The outcome is presented in Table 4 (top), which also shows the
standard deviation of the single realizations (bottom). For the DPR
simulated panels we have used Nr=7, which is close to the actual aver-
age number of reviewers per proposal in the experiment. For the OPC
we have set Nr=3. The numerical calculations predict a top and bot-
tom quartile agreement of about 50%, while in the central quartiles this
drops to about 30%. The statistical significance of the deviations of the
observed QAM from the average QAM can be quantified using the pre-
dicted dispersion. For the first and fourth quartile, the observed value
(0.37) differs at the 1.3σ-level from the average value. For the central
quartiles the difference is at the ∼1.5σ-level.
Therefore, although lower than expected on average, the observed
DPR-OPC agreement is statistically consistent with that expected from
the statistical description of the pre-meeting OPC process (P18).
One important aspect to remark is that, given the large noise inher-
ent to the process, a much larger data-set (or more realizations of the
experiment) would be required to reach a statistical significance suffi-
ciently high to make robust claims about systematic deviations.
10.6 Comparison with the post-meeting outcome
The fact that in the real OPC process there is a face-to-face meeting
constitutes the most pronounced difference between the two review
schemes. In the meeting, the opinions of single reviewers are changed
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Table 5: OPC Quartile Migration Matrix
OPC pre-m. OPC post-meeting quartile (N=683)
quartile 1 2 3 4
1 0.64 0.25 0.06 0.05
2 0.26 0.37 0.28 0.08
3 0.08 0.26 0.39 0.26
4 0.02 0.11 0.25 0.62
DPR sub-set (N=136)
1 0.56 0.32 0.12 0.00
2 0.32 0.32 0.29 0.06
3 0.12 0.26 0.38 0.24
4 0.00 0.09 0.21 0.71
Table 6: DPR vs. OPC post-meeting QAM
DPR OPC post-meeting quartile (N=136)
quartile 1 2 3 4
1 0.26 0.38 0.24 0.12
2 0.24 0.35 0.24 0.18
3 0.32 0.12 0.29 0.26
4 0.19 0.15 0.24 0.44
by the discussion, so that the grades attributed by the single referees
are not completely independent from each other (as opposed to the pre-
meeting phase, in which the possible correlation should depend only
on the intrinsic merits of the proposal).
The effects of the meeting can be quantified in terms of the quartile
agreement fractions between the pre- and post-meeting outcomes, as
outlined in Patat (2019, hereafter P19). Based on the P18 sample, P19
concludes that the change is significant: on average, only 75% of the
proposals ranked in the top quartile before the meeting remain in the
top quartile after the discussion (about 20% are demoted to the second
quartile, and 5% to the third quartile). P19 characterizes this effect in-
troducing the Quartile Migration Matrix (QMM). For the specific case
of P103, the QMM is reported in Table 5 for the 683 proposals that
passed the triage (top), and for the sub-set of the DPR experiment (bot-
tom).2
As anticipated, the effect of the discussion is very pronounced. In
the light of these facts one can finally inspect the QAM between the
DPR and the final outcome of the OPC process. This is presented in
Table 6. With the only possible exception of M4,4, which indicates a rel-
atively marked agreement for the proposals in the bottom quartile, the
two reviews appear to be almost completely uncorrelated. By means
of simple Monte-Carlo calculations one can show that for two fully
aleatory panels the standard deviation of a single realization around
the average value (0.25) is 0.10. Therefore, the majority of the Mi, j
elements in Table 6 are consistent with a stochastic process at the 1σ
level.
The main conclusion is that while the pre-meeting agreement is
consistent with the DPR and OPC reviewers behaving in a very similar
way (in terms of r-r and p-p agreements), the face-to-face meeting has
the effect of significantly increasing the discrepancy between the two
processes. We remark that the sample is relatively small, and therefore
the results are significantly affected by noise.
2Of the initial 172 proposals included in the DPR sample, 36 were triaged out in the
OPC process.
A Feedback questionnaire
The following is the multiple choice questions that were presented to
the participants in the questionnaire at the end of the experiment. The
bold numbers after the multiple choice answers are the number of the
participants that selected this answer.
A.1 What is your gender?
• Male 96
• Female 46
• Prefer not to say 5
• (no answer given) 0
A.2 How many years are you after your PhD?
• Negative; I don’t have my PhD yet. 12
• Less than 4 years 27
• Between 4 and 12 years 51
• More than 12 years 57
• (no answer given) 0
A.3 How many proposals have you submitted to ESO as PI
in the past?
• None; this is my first proposal as PI. 0
• Less than 3 proposals 14
• Between 3 and 10 proposals 55
• More than 10 proposals 78
• (no answer given) 0
A.4 How often have you been a panel member of the ESO
Observing Programmes Committee (OPC)?
• Never; I have not yet been on the OPC. 112
• I am currently and OPC panel member. 3
• I served as OPC panel member for one term. 12
• I served more than one term on the OPC. 20
• (no answer given) 0
A.5 How easy was it to navigate and use the interface to
review the proposals?
• Easy, no problems in usage 117
• Mostly easy; some improvements possible 28
• Rather difficult; some improvements needed 2
• Difficult; several problems in usage 0
• (no answer given) 0
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A.6 How much time did you spend, on average, per pro-
posal (including writing comments)?
• Less than 15 minutes 0
• Between 15 and 30 minutes 41
• Between 30 and 45 minutes 62
• Over 45 minutes 44
• (no answer given) 0
A.7 Was the time spent for proposals for which you are an
expert versus a non-expert different?
• More time on proposals for which I am an expert 15
• About the same 62
• Less time on proposals for which I am an expert 69
• (no answer given) 1
A.8 How appropriate were the assessment criteria to eval-
uate the proposals?
• Fully appropriate; the criteria were clear and easy to apply 53
• Mostly appropriate; the criteria were clear but not easy to apply
73
• Somewhat appropriate; the criteria can be clarified but were ap-
plicable 18
• Not appropriate; the criteria should be changed 2
• (no answer given) 1
A.9 How satisfactorily were you able to evaluate the pro-
posals for which you were a non-expert?
• Fully; I could evaluate well and fairly as a non-expert 3
• Mostly; I sometimes missed the expertise but was still able to eval-
uate fairly 53
• Somewhat; I struggled and might not always have been able to
evaluate fairly 75
• Not satisfactorily; I might have unintentionally provided an unfair
evaluation 16
• (no answer given) 0
A.10 How useful were the comments that you received on
your proposal?
• Fully; overall the comments will allow me to improve my pro-
posed project 17
• Mostly; several comments will help me to strengthen my proposed
project 70
• Somewhat; some comments might help me to strengthen my pro-
posed project 53
• Not useful; the comments will not help me to improve my pro-
posed project 6
• (no answer given) 1
A.11 How clear and appropriate were the comments that
you received on your proposal?
• Fully; overall the comments were clear and appropriate 36
• Mostly; some comments were not fully clear but mostly appropri-
ate 72
• Somewhat; several comments were unclear or not fully appropri-
ate 36
• Not; several comments were unclear and inappropriate 3
• (no answer given) 0
A.12 How do these raw comments compare to the edited
comments from the OPC in the past?
• These raw comments were better; the OPC edited comments were
less helpful. 62
• Of similar quality 66
• These raw comments were less helpful; the OPC edited comments
were better. 18
• Not applicable; I have not received OPC edited comments before.
1
• (no answer given) 0
A.13 For which types of proposals do you think distributed
peer review would be beneficial? (multiple answers
possible)
• Short proposals, with total requested time less than 20 hours 0
• Regular proposals, with total requested time between 1 and 100
hours 0
• Large proposals, with total requested time more than 100 hours 0
• None 0
• (no answer given) 4
A.14 The ESO Time Allocation Working Group recom-
mended to introducein addition to the existing calls
for proposalsa ’Fast Track’ channel with a fraction
of the time allocated through (two) monthly calls. If
implemented, would distributed peer review be ap-
propriate for this time allocation? (multiple answers
possible)
• I would support distributed peer review being used for the ’Fast
Track’ calls. 105
• I have concerns with distributed peer review being used for the
’Fast Track’ calls. 23
• I am indifferent. 19
• (no answer given) 0
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A.15 Securing confidentiality in the process:
• I am neither more nor less concerned about confidentiality issues
in the DPR process than in the OPC process. 73
• I am more concerned about confidentiality issues in the DPR pro-
cess than in the OPC process. 42
• I am less concerned about confidentiality issues in the DPR pro-
cess than in the OPC process. 8
• I have no strong opinion on this point. 24
• (no answer given) 0
A.16 External expertise in the review process:
• I think that the pool of eight peer reviewers (including some non-
experts) are sufficient to assess the proposals. 43
• I think that the pool of eight peer reviewers are sufficient to assess
the proposals, provided that they have some expertise in the field.
73
• I think that external experts (non-ESO facility users) are critical to
the assessment of the proposals and must be added as reviewers.
22
• I have no strong opinion on this point. 8
• (no answer given) 1
A.17 Robustness of the review process against any biases:
• I think that DPR review process is as robust against biases as the
OPC review process. 38
• I think that DPR review process is more robust against biases than
the OPC review process. 39
• I think that DPR review process is less robust against biases than
the OPC review process. 25
• I have no strong opinion on this point. 43
• (no answer given) 2
B Feedback questions statistics and overview
Statistics figures of the feedback overview.
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Figure 12: The referee was asked the question How many years are you
after your PhD?
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Figure 13: The referee was asked the question How many proposals
have you submitted to ESO as PI in the past?
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Figure 14: The referee was asked the question How often have you
been a panel member of the ESO Observing Programmes Committee
(OPC)?
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Figure 15: The referee was asked the question Have you served on
another time allocation committee?
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Figure 16: The referee was asked the question How easy was it to
navigate and use the interface to review the proposals?
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Figure 17: The referee was asked the question How much time did you
spend, on average, per proposal (including writing comments)?
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Figure 18: The referee was asked the question Was the time spent for
proposals for which you are an expert versus a non-expert different?
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Figure 19: The referee was asked the question How appropriate were
the assessment criteria to evaluate the proposals?
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Figure 20: The referee was asked the question How satisfactorily were
you able to evaluate the proposals for which you were a non-expert?
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Figure 21: The referee was asked the question How useful were the
comments that you received on your proposal?
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Figure 22: The referee was asked the question How clear and appro-
priate were the comments that you received on your proposal?
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Figure 23: The referee was asked the question How do these raw com-
ments compare to the edited comments from the OPC in the past?
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Figure 24: The referee was asked the question For which types of pro-
posals do you think distributed peer review would be beneficial?
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Figure 25: The referee was asked the question The ESO Time Alloca-
tion Working Group recommended to introducein addition to the ex-
isting calls for proposalsa ’Fast Track’ channel with a fraction of the
time allocated through (two) monthly calls. If implemented, would dis-
tributed peer review be appropriate for this time allocation?
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Figure 26: The referee was asked the question Securing confidentiality
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Figure 27: The referee was asked the question External expertise in the
review process:
I think that
DPR review
process is
more robust
against
biases than
the OPC
review
process.
I think that
DPR review
process is
as robust
against
biases as
the OPC
review
process.
I think that
DPR review
process is
less robust
against
biases than
the OPC
review
process.
I have no
strong
opinion on
this point.
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
F
ra
ct
io
n
Figure 28: The referee was asked the question Robustness of the review
process against any biases:
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